Assessing the impact of the funding environment on researchers' risk aversion: the use of citation statistics by Zoller, Frank et al.
Assessing the impact of the funding environment
on researchers’ risk aversion: the use of citation statistics
Frank A. Zoller • Eric Zimmerling • Roman Boutellier
Published online: 19 January 2014
 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014
Abstract The funding environment has a profound impact on researchers’ behavior. In
particular, it influences their freedom and readiness to conduct research ventures with
highly uncertain outcomes. In this conceptual paper, we propose a concise new method-
ology to evaluate researchers’ risk aversion based on citation statistics. The derived single-
number criterion PR is sensitive to the ratio of high impact versus average impact work,
based on citation counts. We demonstrate the usefulness of PR on a micro and meso level
in the field of chemistry. PR is a potentially valuable tool for managers in higher education,
to control for the impact of their funding instruments. The conducted testing may, in
addition, contribute to the literature stream dealing with the effects of peer review in the
allocation of research funding. Our results support the view that peer review fosters
mainstream research. However, faculties with the highest percentages of third-party
funding may find ways to avoid the restrictive effects. We also find evidence that per-
manent positions back risky research endeavors.
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Introduction
Faculties adapt their research behavior to the funding environment to which they are
exposed. This adaptation presumably impacts research agendas and, therefore, the research
output. Scholars have studied the impact of various input variables on the research output of
a wide range of research entities. This paper intends to broaden the toolset for studying the
impact of different funding mechanisms on research output. We derive researchers’ read-
iness to assume risks from the citation characteristics of their published output. We believe
that it is relevant for policymakers and managers in higher education to understand how
differences in the funding environment influence researchers’ risk aversion, since, for
example, breakthrough research is associated with risk-taking. To the authors’ knowledge,
this paper presents the first single-number criterion to evaluate the impact of funding
instruments on researcher’s risk-taking comprehensively, and to illustrate risk-return pat-
terns. The criterion is derived in the first part of the paper, which reviews the literature.
Furthermore, we evaluate the new tool, using examples at an individual (micro), and an
institutional (meso) level of analysis. In the last part, we discuss policy related implications.
Funding environment
With easy access to the Web of Science1 and similar databases, the use of bibliometrics to
analyze research output quantitatively has become increasingly popular. The output or
productivity of researchers has been assessed by counting patents and publications, or their
respective number of citations. Input factors, such as the age of the researchers (e.g.
Bonaccorsi and Daraio 2003), faculty structure (e.g. Dundar and Lewis 1998), and espe-
cially group size (e.g. Carayol and Matt 2006; Leitner et al. 2007) have been analyzed,
with respect to scientific output. However, among the different input factors, funding is
regarded as having the highest impact (Auranen and Nieminen 2010), and has, accordingly,
often been subject of corresponding studies (e.g. Butler 2003; Leydesdorff and Wagner
2009a; Lewison and Dawson 1998).
Scholars’ aim to better understand the determinants of research productivity goes along
with the pressure for more accountability in public research spending. The call for an
efficient expenditure of public finances has increased significantly, including in the context
of publicly funded research (Weber and Duderstadt 2004). For this reason, a shift from
recurrent and stable core funding to performance-based allocation has taken place, espe-
cially in Europe (Lepori et al. 2007). Funding channels have been changed from distributive
or proportional allocation towards a more contractually oriented approach (Geuna 2001).
Market-like instruments have emerged. Decentralized agencies allocate funds following an
application and evaluation process which is often described as having a negative correlation
with intellectual pluralism, and a positive correlation with reputational competition
(Whitley 2003). Third-party funding is believed to have a discipline effect and is, therefore,
seen as increasing the quantitative research output (Bolli and Somogyi 2011). However, the
findings of the impact on research quality are mixed.2 In the course of reforms in several
higher education systems, the ratio between non-permanent staff and tenured faculty
1 Thomson Reuters, http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/science/science_products/a-z/web_of_
science/.
2 Hornbostel (2001) or Lewison and Dawson (1998), e.g., found a positive impact, while Leydesdorff and
Wagner (2009b) found positive and negative influence. Butler (2003) found indications of a negative impact.
Zhao (2010) or Carayol and Matt (2004) found no influence.
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members has increased, and tenure track positions have been fostered (Musselin 2005). A
promotion or a renewal of a labor contract is—similar to the allocation of third-party
funding—usually associated with an assessment based on a peer review process. In such a
peer review process, the focus is either put on the applicant’s track record or, in the case of
project funding, mostly on the proposed research agenda, including the expected results.
The applicant in the latter case will, therefore, only receive funding on the condition of
following their research agenda, which had been presented to the reviewing peer group.
Risk-taking and research output
Policy makers can influence the research landscape by changing the funding environment.
Researchers will adapt to the changes in the environment, and react to funding agencies’
actual allocation criteria (Liefner 2003), and adaptation has even become a key success
factor (Tammi 2009; Laudel 2006a). In the case of evaluation-based funding, the adaption
process is biased towards short-term performance, and conventional or mainstream
approaches, leading to a neglect of long-term or risky research (Marginson and Considine
2000, p. 171). Peer judgment considerably reduces the probability of receiving funds for
‘‘exotic’’ research projects. Also outstanding, risky projects were rarely supported (Laudel
2006a; Weingart 2005; Henkel 2000, p. 118). But, breakthrough research—in the sense of
Thomas Kuhn (1962)—is often of a speculative and unorthodox nature. Therefore, it does
often not receive favorable peer judgments. Even Nobel Prize awarded research failed
initially to receive peer judged project funding (Tatsioni et al. 2010). Risk aversion can,
therefore, be seen as promoting more mainstream and less ground-breaking research
(Heinze 2008). Ground-breaking research requires the freedom and flexibility to seize
opportunities, thus abandoning initial research plans (Bovier et al. 2001). Taking high risks
is thus associated with a few ground-breaking discoveries of high impact, and a very large
number of failures which, at best, lead to low-impact output. Mainstream research is often
problem-solving, and reflected in output of moderate impact. In its entirety, however,
mainstream research is of high significance for scientific progress.
Assessing risk-return patterns
The number of citations is a good indicator of research impact (Goldfarb 2008). Faculties
that conduct risky research projects have a high probability of ending up at a dead end, or
find themselves adjusting the research direction after a certain period of time. Those
attempts most likely receive little to no attention in the form of citations. If, however, the
rare case sets in, and a risky research venture is successful, the results and findings are
often revolutionary and fundamentally new. As a result, they gain the highest possible level
of attention and are frequently cited (Liefner 2003). Mainstream research often moderately
expands the state of knowledge in well-known areas of study. Researchers and sponsors
risk little: relatively easily publishable results with an average number of citations, is the
most likely outcome. Researchers often strike a balance between high risk and mainstream
research by addressing various research projects of different risk levels.
Measure for risk-return pattern
By plotting the rank abundance curves of citation counts, similar to Hirsch’s well known h-
index (Hirsch 2005), we can expect to be able to, based on the preceding discussion,
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distinguish patterns which represent the scientific output of projects with high risk levels,
and patterns corresponding to only moderate risk levels (see Fig. 1). To compare different
risk-return patterns directly, we introduce a new risk parameter PR. PR is sensible to the
ratio between high impact research output and average impact output. The parameter is
intended for being higher the larger risk-taking. PR is defined as the 98th percentile divided
by the median, or:
PR ¼ Q:98
Q:50
within a sample, PR therefore indicates how much more often high impact work is cited in
comparison to average impact work. As a relative measure, it is independent of the
absolute level of citations and is not very sensitive to any particular research area. How-
ever, the publication and citation characteristics that differ from one scientific discipline to
another might affect PR.
PR characterizes the shape of the curves, showing the number of citations versus the
paper number, with papers numbered in order of decreasing citations. The parameter’s
independence of the absolute number of publications and citations makes it also inde-
pendent of the overall impact or successfulness of the analyzed work. For our sample sizes
(between 152 and 2,790 papers), the 98th percentile was found to be more robust against
extreme values than, for example, the 99.9th percentile, but still well able to capture the
upper most part of the curve. It is, therefore, suited for representing high impact research.
The median represents the lower part of the curve or the average research outcome. The
citation numbers corresponding to median and 98th percentile, respectively, were calcu-
lated by linear interpolation between the closest ranks.
Validation of criterion PR
In order to demonstrate the usefulness and the predictive power of the risk parameter PR,
we analyzed PR for several different funding environments. With two different datasets we
Fig. 1 The schematic curves represent the research output under a regime of high risk-taking and risk-
aversion, respectively. Calculating the ratio (PR) between the 98th percentile and the median, the different
regimes can be distinguished. To compare the curves visually, the sample sizes were normalized to 100
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studied the impact of third-party funding and core funding on PR, once at the micro and
once at the meso level. In addition, we examined the difference between individual and
project funding, and temporal versus tenured faculty positions.
Data sources
Citation characteristics differ depending on the scientific field. To test the above presented
model we had to restrict ourselves to one discipline, and settled on the field of chemistry
for three reasons. First, in chemistry, journals are the main source of publication, ensuring
a fair amount of publications even on less aggregated levels. Second, co-authorship is less
pronounced than in other fields (Melin and Persson 1996), reducing the tendency to assume
that each author significantly contributes to a publications’ impact. Third, in chemistry, a
high correlation between the number of citations as a measure of impact and quality, based
on assessments by peers, was found for published papers (Van Raan 2006; Abramo et al.
2009). In order to avoid further biases owing to differing citation densities, we restricted
the data acquisition to publications written in English, and as journal articles. In the field
of chemistry, the well-established Web of Science is well suited to gather citation numbers
(Neuhaus and Daniel 2008). To include more recent papers, we chose variable citation
windows3 (Moed 1996), and extracted the citation data in July 2011.
Hypotheses and testing
The following hypotheses are based on the assumption that in otherwise equal environ-
ments, faculties’ risk-taking depends on their scientific freedom. The lesser faculties have
to please peer groups’ expectations, the riskier their research ventures are, and the higher
the identified PR.
Limited versus tenured positions
Professors’ faculty positions can be differentiated between permanent and non-permanent
appointments. In a Swiss context, the permanent professors (assistant, associate or full
professors) are appointed until retirement, and receive stable and comparably high
recurrent core funding. The non-permanent professors, mostly assistant professors (tenure
track, non-tenure track), are independent in setting their own research agenda, and also
receive substantial core funding. However, 4–6 years after having been appointed, their
output is evaluated by peer review. This assessment is decisive for future employment and
is often perceived as ‘‘publish or perish’’. It is understandable that non-permanent pro-
fessors may not wish to start risky research endeavors to avoid their efforts having a high
probability of no publishable results. On the contrary, they are highly motivated to pass the
peer reviewed publication processes and may aim for rather mainstream and low-risk work.
This led to the first hypothesis:
(H1): PR is higher for professors with permanent faculty positions compared to non-
permanently employed professors.
3 A variable citation window further allows for straightforward data retrieval from electronic databases.
Compared to a fixed citation window (Moed 1996), it is, however, prone to underestimating the significance
of the differences in PR because even high impact publications need time to receive citations. The period of
time between extracting the citation data and the issue date of the latest publications should therefore be in
the range of a journal’s cited half-life.
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To test H1, we looked into the professorate in chemistry at Swiss universities. The eight
Swiss universities which have a chemistry department employ 112 full time professors.4 32
were non-permanently employed. From those 32 we had to exclude 14 because they started
their new positions after 2009, or hadn’t yet published anything in a chemistry journal.
(They chose publication vehicles from, e.g., cell biology or medical sciences instead). Like
Pao (1991), before comparison we extracted a subset of professors from the group of
permanent professors. The 11 professors of this latter subset had the highest similarity with
the remaining 18 non-permanently employed professors, with respect to their starting year
and quantitative publication output. For all remaining professors, we searched in a top-
down approach (van Leeuwen 2007) for articles which were published no later than 2003
or the respective professors’ starting year in their current position. We searched in the Web
of Science for names, then manually checked and cleaned the derived data using infor-
mation on addresses and institution names. For the permanent professors, we ended up with
160 articles, with an average of 26.9 citations. For the non-permanent professors, we
gathered 152 publications with an average of 25.2 citations.
Ratio of third-party and recurrent core funding
For several years, scholars have speculated that the allocation of research funds by peer
judgment would discourage ground-breaking research, and that the focus on third-party
funding would foster low-risk and mainstream-oriented research. As a countermeasure,
large shares of recurrent core funding is recommended (Laudel 2006b). To test the impact
of the share of third-party funding on the university landscape at a meso and micro level,
we stated the following two hypotheses:
(H2): Within one institution, PR is higher for professors the lower their percentage of
third-party funding.
(H3): For universities, PR is higher the lower the percentage of third-party funding.
We tested H2 with data from the department of chemistry of ETH Zurich. At ETH, the
amount of core funding that a chair receives is a matter of negotiation at their appointment
or promotion. Third-party funds are raised by the chair on their own. We used the official,
non-public financial report of the department to find the funding sources for each professor
for the period 2006–2009. We included 5 professors from the field of inorganic chemistry,
7 from organic chemistry and 8 from physical chemistry. We excluded the discipline
chemical engineering, assuming different publication characteristics in that field. We
further divided the 20 professors into 3 groups, according to the percentage of third-party
funding they received: one group with above average; one with below average; and one
with an average share of third-party funding. One category is for professors with less than
55 %, one for 55–65 %; and one for more than 65 % third-party funding. The thresholds
were chosen where we found significant gaps in the distribution, at the same time ensuring
that all three groups were of similar size. In a bottom-up approach, similar to van Leeuwen
(2007), we extracted the publication lists for the 20 professors from the official annual
report, and matched them with the Web of Science to gather the citation counts. We found
756 articles for the years 2006–2009 with an average of 17.9 citations per article.
4 These were the universities of: Basel, Berne, Fribourg, Geneva, Neuchaˆtel, Zu¨rich, EPF Lausanne, and
ETH Zurich.
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To test H3, we selected 20 renowned universities5 using the ARWU6 and the THE7
rankings. To achieve a higher diversity, we did not select strictly, according to the ranking
order, but instead underweighted US universities in favor of Asian and continental
European universities. To analyze the income streams of the universities, we gathered
information from the annual reports or financial statements for the fiscal year 2009, which
were published on the universities’ own web pages. The six US universities were an
exception, where we consulted the official statistical report of the US National Science
Foundation on research expenditure for the year 2009 (NSF 2011). We divided the income
sources for all universities into two categories: basic, undirected funding, and third-party
funding. The first category included state subsidies, block grants, investment income, fees,
and endowments. The latter category included research grants, directed donations, and
income from contract research. Subsequently, we grouped the universities into institutions
with less than 35, 35–85 %, and those with more than 85 % third-party funding. For all 20
universities in the sample, we gathered the publication data from 2003 to 2009 in a top-
down approach. We searched in the Web of Science for our chosen universities, using the
look-up fields for the organization name and address. We refined the search to the chemical
subfields physical chemistry and organic chemistry, since these were the only disciplines
that all 20 universities were active in. We found 421–2,790 publications per university,
with an average of 18.2 citations per article.
Project versus ad personam funding
In their study, Heinze et al. (2009) claim that research breakthroughs are strongly enhanced
by flexible funding; flexible in the sense of not binding money to any specific purpose, but
allowing researchers to use it for ‘‘high-risk/high potential investments’’. They conclude,
similar to Bovier et al. (2001), that faculties should have the possibility to reallocate funds
towards the most promising ventures. Funding agencies usually allocate funds either
directly to individual principal investigators with little restriction, or they fund the exe-
cution of a clearly pre-defined project. To test the impact of principal investigators’
flexibility in the reallocation of funds, we looked more closely into ad personam funding
and project funding schemes and formulated the following hypothesis:
(H4): Funded by the same agency, PR is higher for principal investigators with ad
personam grants than for those with project grants.
To test the H4, we extracted the data for all grants approved by the Swiss National
Science Foundation in the field of chemistry, for the years 2003–2009. We excluded grants
smaller than CHF 20,000, assuming too little impact on recipients’ publication records.8
We found 463 entries for individual funding and 950 entries for project funding. We
searched for publications by the grantees in the Web of Science. Following Defazio et al.
5 These were: California Institute of Technology, EPF Lausanne, ETH Zurich, Harvard University, Imperial
College London, Kyoto University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Nagoya University, National
University of Singapore, Seoul National University, Stanford University, Tohoku University, Tokyo
Institute of Technology, Trinity College Dublin, TU Munich, University of California Berkeley, University
of Oxford, University of Stockholm, Utrecht University, and Yale University.
6 Academic Ranking of World Universities (Shanghai ranking); www.arwu.org.
7 Times Higher Education World University Rankings; www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/world-university-
rankings.
8 The highest grant in the resulting sample was CHF 1.6 m, with an average grant size of CHF 281,500.
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(2009), we looked for papers published in a window during the period of funding plus the
subsequent 2 years.9 After manually filtering the Web search by comparing first names,
address and institution information, we had 1,411 hits for project funding from 234 dif-
ferent authors and 408 hits for individual funding from 151 different authors. The papers in
the group of individual funding were, on average, cited 17.1 times, and the ones in the
project funding group 18.1 times.
Results and discussion
The rationale behind the first hypothesis is that, in a Swiss context, permanent faculty
members have a higher incentive to start risky research ventures than non-permanently
employed faculty members. In the case of failure, the first group merely has to fear career
obstacles or financial setbacks. We did find that the calculated PR for permanent faculties is
14.1, versus 8.2 for non-permanent faculties (see Fig. 2). Hence, H1 can be accepted.
Given the condition of solid and concurrent core funding, research managers can influence
professors’ risk-taking by clarifying their prospects for development.
The analysis of the citation data for different percentages of third-party funded research
budgets showed a characteristic correlation between PR and the funding regime. However,
the interdependencies contradicted hypotheses H2 and H3. As hypothesized, the lowest
percentage of third-party funding led to the highest PR values. However, we found that the
research groups with the highest percentage of third-party funding had higher PR values
than the groups with an average level (see Fig. 3). The effects are more pronounced for the
micro (H2) than for meso (H3) level of analysis. This finding is in line with a review by
Daniel, who claims that the differences in research output between universities are smaller
Fig. 2 The rank curves for citations can be distinguished clearly and assigned to more risk-averse research
behavior (non-permanent professors), and higher risk-taking behavior (permanent professors), respectively
9 The average grant duration was 24.9 months.
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than the differences within a university (Daniel 2001, p. 30). The financial data we
acquired are aggregated at an institutional level, and not at the level of the chemistry
departments which produced the cited research output. We therefore have to assume a
dilution effect for the universities; the meso level (H3).
There are different possible explanations for the U-shaped outcome of the PR versus
third-party funding curves. The well-known Matthew effect in science (Merton 1968)
might make it easier for already well-financed principal investigators to find funding
agencies who accept their risky projects. They might also choose agencies that are more
likely to accept shirking10 (Van der Meulen 1998), i.e. to retain (Liefner 2003) or divert
(Shove 2003) a certain part of the received funds. Or the faculties in groups U3 and P3 (see
Tables 1 and 2) might simply have more possibilities to shirk. Since there is a trend to shift
the financing streams away from recurrent core funding in many educational systems,
Fig. 3 The relation of third-party funding and PR is U-shaped. Faculties with an above average percentage
of third-party funding manage to finance their high-risk projects better than those with an average share.
However, those with a below average share of third-party funding perform the riskiest research
Table 1 Risk parameter PR for professors of physical, inorganic, and organic chemistry at ETH Zurich
Group Third-party funding Group size PR
Range (%) Average (%)
P1 \55 37.7 8 10.19
P2 55–65 59.4 7 8.23
P3 [65 82.6 5 9.10
Funding and publications were analyzed for the years 2006–2009
10 In principal–agent relationships, the agent’s cheating by exploiting an information asymmetry is often
denoted as ‘shirking’. The principal does not know for sure if the agent is really doing his or her best after
the delegation of a task (Braun and Guston 2003).
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faculties have to adapt. Presumably, the faculties in groups U3 and P3 were more expe-
rienced in grant acquisition, and therefore more successful than those in U2 or P2 in raising
funds that allow them to strictly follow their own research agenda (Liefner 2003). The
universities are not grouped homogenously in terms of geographical location. An addi-
tional explanation for the results of U3 may, therefore, come from its composition. It
consists only of private US institutions that may have a different research culture and risk-
taking attitude from European or East Asian universities.
With the fourth hypothesis we wanted to test whether the Swiss National Science
Foundation’s individual funding offers more freedom of research than their project
funding. This would lead to principal investigators taking more risks. Our results neither
support nor reject H4. PR is indeed higher for individual funding. However, the difference
is weak, and the rank abundance plots of the two different funding regimes are almost
identical (see Fig. 4). After interviews with three members of the research council,
responsible for granting both individual and project funding in chemistry, we found that, in
both cases, the decision-making criteria were similar. They always base their decision on
an applicant’s track record, as well as on future projects. The importance of a clear
research agenda, also in the case of individual funding, might therefore contribute strongly
to the indifferent outcome. A noticeable difference between the two funding streams is the
composition of career levels of the sponsored principal investigators. While only 8 % of
the grants for individual funding were allocated to applicants holding the title of a pro-
fessor, the value of project funding was 69 %. The observed outcome could, therefore, be
influenced by the early career stage of the ad personam funded researchers. As discussed in
H1, an early career stage may be prone to risk-aversion and may compensate for a pull on
PR by individual funding.
Conclusion
We intended, with this paper, to introduce a quantitative tool that is convenient and easy to
apply. The tool should be helpful for evaluating the impact of different funding environ-
ments on researchers’ risk appetite, and published research output. The tool indeed proved
itself to be useful for stimulating the discussion of the four hypotheses, relevant to the
Table 2 Risk parameter PR for publications from 2003 to 2009 in the fields of physical and organic








U1 EPF Lausanne, ETH Zurich, Nagoya University, National University of
Singapore, Tokyo Institute of Technology, TU Munich, Trinity
College, University of Stockholm
\35 28.9 8.60
U2 Imperial College London, Kyoto University, Seoul National University,
Tohoku University, Utrecht University, University of California
Berkeley, University of Oxford
35–85 47.4 8.24
U3 California Institute of Technology, Harvard University, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Stanford University, Yale University
[85 96.5 8.34
Funding was analyzed at the level of universities for the year 2009
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efficacy of the allocation of research funds. For example, members of the research council
of the Swiss National Science Foundation were initially surprised to see that their ad
personam and project funding led to similar results, until they realized, that in both cases,
the allocation criteria were very similar. Our tool should be helpful for many funding
agencies and research managers to review their funding instruments’ impact, also outside
the field of chemistry. The calculation of PR can be a valuable indicator in an academic
environment, in mitigating the managerial challenge of finding the right balance between
strongly influencing faculties’ research agendas and a complete laissez-faire.
In order to directly validate the accuracy of the assumed causality between a
researcher’s risk-taking behavior and PR, further longitudinal studies are necessary.
Researchers’ risk-aversion could thereby be assessed by surveys and the results could later
be related to the citation statistics of the published research results. The hypotheses we
tested in this paper, to demonstrate the usefulness of PR, do have their methodological
limitations. It was only in the case of H2 that we were able to use authorized publication
lists. In the other cases, we used a top-down approach to search for publications directly on
the Web of Science. The publications could, in addition, not be assigned to specific grants.
The examined papers do not disclose their funding sources completely, and when they do,
they do not comply with any standardized rules. However, self-declaration by the authors
also wouldn’t be a complete remedy since they are prone to incorrect declarations for
political reasons. Another limitation is that the financial statements used for the validation
of H3 were not generated according to the same accounting standards, which limits their
comparability. Nevertheless, the different potential sources of error should not lead to any
systematic bias, other than diminishing the difference between the two samples that were
compared with each other at a time, in all four tests of hypotheses. In general, for a sound
comparison of PR, the different samples have to comprise reasonably large data sets. The
results may otherwise be skewed by noise or dissimilar publication characteristics, for
example a reluctance to publish, which are not necessarily related to risk-aversion in
Fig. 4 The rank abundance curve of project funding (PF) is almost congruent with the one for individual
funding (IF)
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research. The validation of H2 and H3 has shown that the Matthew effect and the
acceptance of shirking may affect the scientific freedom and therefore influence PR. The
freedom increases with a principal investigator’s standing. A comparison of PR, as e.g. the
validation of H1, should therefore consider the equality of the subsets regarding the
researchers’ career stages.
Despite the weaknesses in some data sets, this paper can also contribute to the ongoing
discussion on the impact of peer review and third-party funding on research output. Our
results support the findings by Heinze et al., who conducted a qualitative study, and found
that core funding without the involvement of any reviewing research council, was very
important for achieving breakthrough results in at least two out of five cases (Heinze et al.
2009, p. 618). We showed evidence that high impact research is indeed fostered—at the
expense of a lower quantity of medium impact publications—by high recurrent and stable
core funding streams. We share the concerns of Heinze et al. (2009) that peer reviewed
funding may judge new ideas as too speculative or unorthodox. Peer-review is prone to
supporting more conventional mainstream research, with a negative effect on visionary and
high-risk approaches.
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